Abstract. We prove that multidimensional generalized median voter schemes are coalition-proof.
Introduction
It is well-known that the majority rule is not transitive. In order to guarantee transitivity we have to restrict the preferences of the voters. The first well-known restriction is single-peakedness, which was introduced by Arrow (1951) and Black (1948) . The median voter scheme over the domain of single-peaked preferences was shown to be compatible with Condorcet's rule. Moulin (1980) has introduced generalized median voter schemes over one-dimensional sets of alternatives. His paper includes, among other results, both the characterization of all strategy-proof voting schemes, and the characterization of anonymous, strategyproof, and Paretian generalized median voter schemes. He also characterized the family of schemes which only satisfy anonymity and strategy-proofness. Border and Jordan (1983) extended generalized median voter schemes to multidimensional sets of alternatives. As far as we know, the latest generalization of Moulin (1980) is due to Barberá, Gul and Stacchetti (1993) . They consider generalized median voter schemes over multi-dimensional sets of alternatives. As expected, they restrict their analysis to multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences. One of their important results is that multi-dimensional generalized median
We are grateful to two anonymous referees for some helpful remarks. The second author was partially supported by the Edmund Landau Center for Research in Mathematical Analysis and Related Areas, sponsored by the Minerva Foundation (Germany) voter schemes are characterized by strategy-proofness. We prove in this work that multi-dimensional generalized median voter schemes are also coalition-proof. For the notion of coalition-proofness see Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) . Coalition-proofness may be regarded as an interesting stability property to be satisfied by voting schemes, because in many cases the voters may have the opportunity to communicate prior to vote. Therefore, generalized median voter schemes being coalition-proof means that they generate "agreements" which are immune to self-enforcing improving deviations. Peleg (1998) shows that pivotal mechanisms are not coalition-proof. We now shall explain and motivate our result.
Let N be a set of n = 2k + 1, k ≥ 1, voters, let B be a (finite) set of alternatives, and let P 0 be a fixed linear ordering of B . Assume that the preferences of the members of N on B are restricted to be single-peaked with respect to P 0 . Then, the median voter scheme is strategy-proof and Paretian. Moreover, the median voter's peak is an outcome of a strong Nash equilibrium (with respect to the true preferences). Thus, under the foregoing assumptions, the median voter scheme is group strategy-proof. This result remains true, if we replace the median voter scheme by a generalized median voter scheme (see Moulin 1980) . However, Barberá, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) show that multi-dimensional generalized median voter schemes are not coalitionally strategy-proof. In this paper we address the following problem: What is the strongest kind of group stability which is satisfied by all generalized median voter schemes? We solve the foregoing problem in Sects. 4 and 5: Theorem 4.1 proves that every multidimensional generalized median voter scheme is coalition-proof. Furthermore, in Sect. 5 we give an example of a generalized median voter scheme which is not strongly coalition-proof.
We now briefly review the contents of this paper. Section 2 contains preliminary definitions and Sect. 3 introduces generalized median voter schemes. The proof of the coalition-proofness of multi-dimensional generalized median voter schemes is presented in Sect. 4. An example of a generalized median voter scheme which is not strongly coalition-proof, is given in Sect. 5. Finally, some remarks are contained in Sect. 6.
Definitions and notations
where N is a finite set of players; A i , i ∈ N , is the (non-empty) set of strategies of i ; and
be a strategic game, let S ⊂ N , S = ∅, and let x ∈ A. The reduced game of G with respect to (w.r.t.) S and x is the game
We now define coalition-proofness by induction on the number of players.
Definition 2.1. (1) In a single player game G, x ∈ A is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) if and only if it is an NE. (2) Let n > 1 and assume that CPNE has been defined for games with fewer than n players. Then a) For any game G with n players, x ∈ A is self-enforcing if, for all S ⊂ N , S = ∅, N , x S is a CPNE in the reduced game G S ,x . b) For any game G with n players, x ∈ A is a CPNE if it is self-enforcing and if there does not exist another self-enforcing strategy vector y ∈
Clearly, a CPNE of a game G is an NE of G. The following definition is closely related to Kaplan's definition of semi-strong equilibrium (see Kaplan 1992) .
a strategic game and let x ∈ A. x is a strong CPNE if (1) x is an NE of G; (2) for every S ⊂ N , S = ∅, and every NE y S of G S ,x , there exists i
Clearly, a strong CPNE of G is a CPNE of G. NE's , CPNE's and SCPNE's are ordinal concepts, that is, they are generalized in a straightforward manner to ordinal games (N ,
where N and A i are defined as above and p i is a preference (i.e. a complete and transitive binary relation) on A. If C is a set and f : A → C is an "outcome function", then every profile
Generalized median voter schemes
In this section we recall some definitions of Barberá et al. (1993) which are essential for our work. Let B be an -dimensional box. We consider B as a metric subspace of the space R with the
A linear order on B is a complete (and, thus, reflexive), transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation on B . If P is a linear order on B , then τ (P ) will denote the (unique) maximum of P on B .
Definition 3.2. A linear order P on a box B is multi-dimensional single-peaked with bliss point α ∈ B if and only if (i) τ (P ) = α, and (ii) βP γ for all
If B is an -dimensional box, then we denote by π = π(B ) the set of all single-peaked preferences with bliss point in B . Let B be an -dimensional box and let N = {1, . . . , n} be a (finite) set of players. 
(f will also be called a voting scheme).
We shall be interested in the following class of voting schemes. First we need an auxiliary definition. 
GMVS's are coalition-proof
Let B be an -dimensional box, let N = {1, . . . , n}, and let f : B N → B be a GMVS. ForP = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ π N we consider the strategic game
Here B is the set of strategies of player i ∈ N ; f is the outcome function; and P 1 , . . . , P n are the preferences of the players on the outcome space. f is coalition-proof if for everyP = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ π N , the n-tupleα =α(P ) = (τ (P 1 ), . . . , τ(P n )) is a CPNE of G(f ; P 1 , . . . , P n ).
Theorem 4.1. Every GMVS is coalition-proof.
Proof. We shall prove our claim by induction on the number of players n.
Step 1. n = 1.
Let B = × j =1 B j be an -dimensional box and let f : B → B be a GMVS. If P ∈ π(B ) then τ (P ) is a dominant strategy in G(f ; P ) = (N ; B ; f ; P ), because f is strategy-proof. Hence τ (P ) is an NE of G(f ; P ).
Assume now that every GMVS with k players, 1 ≤ k < n, is coalition-proof.
be a left-coalition system on B j , j = 1, . . . , , and let f : B N → B be the GMVS which is induced by W j (·), j = 1, . . . , . Furthermore, let P 1 , . . . , P n ∈ π(B ), and α i = τ (P i ), i = 1, . . . , n. We shall prove thatα = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) is a CPNE of G(f ; P 1 , . . . , P n ).
Step 2.α is self-enforcing. 
for all T ⊂ S and all ξ ∈ B j . As the reader may easily verify W j S ,α is a left-coalition system on B j (w.r.t. the set of players S ). Denote by f S ,α the GMVS which is induced by
. Because this is true for each proper subset of N ,α is self-enforcing.
Step 3.α is a CPNE.
Assume, on the contrary, thatα is not a CPNE. Then, there existsβ ∈ B N such that (i)β is self-enforcing (in the game G(f ; P 1 , . . . , P n )), and f (β) / = f (α); and (ii) f (β)P i f (α) for i = 1, . . . , n. We denote s = f (α) and t = f (β). Let s = (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ ) and t = (η 1 , . . . , η ). We distinguish the following possibilities. 
implies that (4.1) or (4.2) is true. Hence, we have proved the existence of a non-empty regretful coalition. Let T be a (non-empty) regretful coalition of minimum size. The following claim is true.
Claim 4.2. For each
Proof of Claim 4.2. Let 1 ≤ m ≤ . We denote
We have to consider seven cases. 
Let T be a (non-empty) minimal (in size) regretful coalition. We conclude from Claim 4.2 that f (α|T ,β|N \ T ) = f (β) and f (α|T ,β|N \ T )P i f (β) for all i ∈ T . Therefore T = N , because, by hypothesis, f (β)P i f (α) for i = 1, . . . , n. Now consider the reduced game (B T ; f T ,β ; (P i ) i ∈T ). By the induction hypothesis α|T is a CPNE of this game. Hence T has an internally consistent improvement uponβ. As T = N this is impossible becauseβ is self-enforcing. Thus, the desired contradiction has been obtained.
Q.E.D.
An example
We shall show by means of an example that GMVS's may not be strongly coalition-proof. Let = 3, B j = {0, 1} for j = 1, 2, 3, and N = {1, 2, 3}. We define a GMVS f by means of the following left-coalition systems:
and let e j be the j -th unit vector in R 3 , j = 1, 2, 3. We define three additive (u : B → R is additive if u(x + y) = u(x ) + u(y) for all x , y ∈ B ) utility functions on B as follows: u 1 (0) = 0, u 1 (e 1 ) = 4, u 1 (e 2 ) = −1, and u 1 (e 3 ) = −2; u 2 (0) = 0, u 2 (e 1 ) = −1, u 2 (e 2 ) = 4, and u 2 (e 3 ) = −2; u 3 (0) = 0, u 3 (e 1 ) = −1, u 3 (e 2 ) = −2, and u 3 (e 3 ) = 4. Let P i be the preference relation represented by u i , i = 1, 2, 3. Then P i is single-peaked with bliss point e i , i = 1, 2, 3. Now f (e 1 , e 2 , e 2 ) = (0, 0, 0) because of our definition of W j (0), j = 1, 2, 3. However, (0, 0, 0) is not Pareto optimal. Indeed, letû 1 be defined bŷ u 1 (0) = 0,û 1 (e 1 ) = 1,û 1 (e 2 ) = 2,û 1 (e 3 ) = 4, and letû 2 =û 3 =û 1 also be three additive utility functions on B . Denote byP i the preference relation represented byû i , i = 1, 2, 3. Clearly, τ (P i ) = (1, 1, 1) = e, i = 1, 2, 3, and f (e, e, e) = e. Also, f (e, e, e)P i f (e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ), i = 1, 2, 3. Moreover, because of our definition of W j (0), j = 1, 2, 3, (e, e, e) is an NE of the game (B N ; f ; P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ). Hence, the truthtelling strategy (e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ) is not a strong CPNE.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we proved that the strongest kind of group stability satisfied by all multi-dimensional GMVS's is coalition-proofness. This result is very far from being a consequence of strategy-proofness. Indeed, Peleg (1998) shows that pivotal mechanisms are not coalition-proof. Also, our result does not follow from Dasgupta et al. (1979) , because multi-dimensional GMVS's may not be group strategy-proof. We recall that Dasgupta et al. (1979) contains a detailed investigation of the relationship between strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness. When the dimension is greater than one, our restricted domain of preferences is too small to yield the Dasgupta-Hammond-Maskin type of results.
